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Introduction
The sponsors' of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) 2
deserve the highest praise. What they achieved represents the culmination of decades of legislative efforts to give American artists rights enjoyed widely throughout the world, especially in Berne Convention
countries. 3 These moral rights include the rights to claim and disclaim
credit for works of art and to prevent mutilation, modification, distortion, and destruction of the artist's work. 4
Any practitioner or academic familiar with earlier state legislation
quickly sees that VARA is the product of very sophisticated drafting. On
the whole it is more detailed than any state law and includes issues barely
covered under many state statutes5 or not covered at all. The protected
subject matter, the "work of visual art," is elaborately defined at § 101 of
the Copyright Act.6 The artist's rights, and the waiver of and exceptions
to those rights, are also extensively elaborated at § 106A. Similarly, the
works-in-buildings provisions at § 113(d) are detailed and thorough.
In first analyzing the legislation, I was impressed by how thorough
and clever it was. However, after two years and the opportunity to see
how VARA works, it is amazing to see the number of ambiguities and
problems the statutory language has spawned. Unlike litigation under
state statutes, in which a few serious issues might develop, litigation
under VARA often involves shotgun defenses in which numerous issues
could arise.
1. Principally sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy (D. Mass.) in the United States
Senate and Representatives Edward Markey (D. Mass.), Robert Kastenmeier (D. Wis.), and
Howard Berman (D. Cal.) in the U.S. House of Representatives.
2. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 601-610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-33 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 506 (Supp. III 1992)).
3. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,

1971, art. 6bis, reprinted in SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 456 (1987).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). See the analysis of Berne Convention rights in Edward J.
Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights
Protectionfor Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 945 (1990); Leonard D. DuBoff et al.,
Artists' Rights: The Kennedy Proposalto Amend the Copyright Law, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 227, 232 (1989).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to -I16t
(West 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-:2156 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
27, § 303 (West 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 598.970-.978 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 24A-1 to -8 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-4B-2 to -3 (Michie 1992); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01, 14.03 (McKinney
1988 & Supp. 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110 (Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 5-62-2 to -6 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-2a-9 (1986).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 101. All references to sections of the Copyright Act refer to title 17,
United States Code.
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The following is a clause-by-clause critique of VARA which shows
some of these hotspots, ambiguities, and problem areas.7 The analysis is
based on the statutory text set forth in capital letters and is followed by
commentary.

I
Subject Matter
§ 101 DEFINITIONS
A "WORK OF VISUAL

ART" IS-

(1)

A PAINTING, DRAWING, PRINT, OR SCULPTURE, EXISTING IN
A SINGLE COPY, IN A LIMITED EDITION OF 200 COPIES OR FEWER
THAT ARE SIGNED AND CONSECUTIVELY NUMBERED BY THE AUTHOR, OR, IN THE CASE OF A SCULPTURE, IN MULTIPLE CAST,
CARVED, OR FABRICATED SCULPTURES OF 200 OR FEWER THAT ARE
CONSECUTIVELY NUMBERED BY THE AUTHOR AND BEAR
8 THE SIGNATURE OR OTHER IDENTIFYING MARK OF THE AUTHOR.

There are always problems defining "painting," '9 "drawing," 1
"print,""1 and "sculpture." 12 For example, is a mural a painting?' 3
What about a mosaic? Or a collage? Where is the borderline between a
print and a poster? Also, where is the borderline between a sculpture, on
the one hand, and an environmental, landscape, or architectural work,
on the other? Because the statute does not provide a broad definition of
"fine art" allowing protection for a large variety of works (including
multi-media works such as some collages or assemblages), many works
7. The analysis covers the major substantive aspects of VARA. The procedural and remedial amendments to title 17 and other miscellaneous matters are not covered.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
9. See Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1130, 1135 (1991) (mural ruled a
"painting" under the California Art Preservation Act); United States v. Perry, 146 U.S. 71, 75
(1892) (stained glass as a "painting"); Tiffany v. United States, 66 F. 736, 737 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1895) (painted silk and bone fans); Brantman v. United States, 54 C.C.P.A. 444 (1965) (illustrated map declared not to be an original for customs purposes).
10. In re Vonnegut & Bohn, 7 Treas. Dec. 414 (1904), affd sub nom. Young v. Bohn, 141
F. 471 (C.C.D. Ind. 1905) (architect's drawing a work of art for customs purposes); Robert H.
Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 637, 644 (1984) (architectural plans
not drawings under the California Art Preservation Act).
11. What is an OriginalPrint? (PrinciplesRecommended by the Print Council ofAmerica)
in ART WORKS: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 441, 444 (Franklin Feldman and Stephen E. Weil

eds., 1974).
12. See Leonard D. DuBoff, Bronze Sculptures. Casting Around for Protection, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 235 (1984) (protection of sculpture in general); United States v.

Olivotti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. 46, 48 (1916) (non-representational sculpture); Stern v.
United States, 3 Ct. Cust. App. 124, 126-27 (1912) (ornamental sculptures); Brancusi v. United
States, 54 Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928) (non-representational sculpture).
13. Yes, according to Botello, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1130.
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will fall into the cracks, and there will be much litigation about basic
definitions. 14
Another problem arises in counting the "limited edition of 200 copies or fewer." In calculating the number of copies, do we include publishers', printers', and artists' proofs? What about prints or proofs that
are hors de commerce? 5 When quantifying an edition, numerous states'
fine art multiple laws refer to the size of the "regular edition," perhaps
excluding proofs, or the size of the "total edition," perhaps including all
proofs except trial proofs and copies hors de commerce. For the statutes
that are silent, there have been few cases, and therefore little explanation,
of these terms. 16 No specifics are given in VARA; thus, courts will make
the decision rather than Congress.
The requirement that copies be "signed and consecutively numbered
by the author" could also create problems. First, what about platesigned limited editions for prints? Why require the author to individually sign and number? After all, many older artists do not personally
sign their editions. In addition, uncertainty will exist with "joint works."
Must all the joint authors sign, or will one signature suffice? No answer
is given in VARA. "
The wording is slightly different for sculptures insofar as the copies
in the limited edition must be "consecutively numbered by the author
and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author."'" The
question is whether the author must personally apply the signature or
identifying mark, which would be a problem for limited edition metal
sculptures, for which the signature or identifying mark is frequently precast. In other words, do the sculpture rules not require the author's personal signature, whereas the rules for limited edition prints do?
(2) [A "WORK OF VISUAL ART" IS ALSO] A STILL PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGE PRODUCED FOR EXHIBITION PURPOSES ONLY, EXISTING IN A SINGLE COPY THAT IS SIGNED

BY

THE AUTHOR,

OR

IN A

LIMITED

14. See e.g., Leonard D. DuBoff, What is Art? Toward a Legal Definition, 12 HASTINGS
CoMM/ENT L.J. 303 (1990); Peter H. Karlen, What is Art?: A Sketch for a Legal Definition,
94 LAW Q. REV. 383 (1978).
15. Literally, "outside of commerce," in other words, "not for sale." These prints or
proofs could be given away, but often they are merely kept by the artist or publisher.
16. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1740-1745.5 (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-433
(Harrison 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 481F-1 to -5 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para.
361-369 (Smith-Hurd 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW §§ 14-501 to -505 (1990); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 442.351-.367 (West 1989); MINN. STAT. §§ 32.081-.10 (1992); N.Y.
ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 15.01-.19 (McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25C-10 to -16
(1989); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 359.300-.315 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-16-10 to -50 (Law.
Co-op. 1992).
17. For problems with joint ownership rules, see generally Peter H. Karlen, Joint Ownership of Moral Rights, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 242 (1991).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
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EDITION OF 200 COPIES OR FEWER THAT
ARE SIGNED AND CONSECU19
TIVELY NUMBERED BY THE AUTHOR.

The same problems arise here with regard to calculating the 200
copies and the signing and numbering requirements. The main focus,
however, must be on the phrase "for exhibition purposes only." Every
photograph is produced for exhibition purposes-it is meant to be shown
to someone. Thus, the statute is probably referring to public exhibition
at a museum, gallery, or other similar exhibition space.2 °
Now that photographic images are digitized, the statute unfairly requires a signature by the author. When a photo exists only on disk, it
should still be protected by moral rights laws. 2' But what happens where
the photo exists both on disk and on a print signed by the author? In
order to get protection, the author would have to destroy the disk, otherwise he would not have a single signed copy or a limited edition of 200 or
fewer copies that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
Under the definition of "copy" at § 101 of the Copyright Act, the "first
22
material object in which the work is fixed" is included as a "copy."9
Therefore, since the word "copy" and not the word "print" is used in
this section of VARA, the artist would actually have to destroy the negative or the disk to fall under the "single copy" language. The only other
alternative (ignoring the "signed by the author" language) would be to
have the negative or disk as the "single copy," with no prints! This is
indeed an error in VARA, as the drafters could not have meant this
result.

A

WORK OF VISUAL ART DOES NOT INCLUDE(A)(i) ANY POSTER,
MAP, GLOBE, CHART, TECHNICAL DRAWING, DIAGRAM, MODEL, APPLIED ART, MOTION PICTURE OR OTHER AUDIOVISUAL WORK, BOOK,
MAGAZINE, NEWSPAPER, PERIODICAL, DATA BASE, ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE,
ELECTRONIC PUBLICATION, OR SIMILAR
23
PUBLICATION.

Many of these exclusions are overkill. After all, if the "work of visual art" is by definition only a painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or
photograph, it could not possibly be a book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication,
or similar publication.24
19. Id.
20. See the definition of "publication" in relation to "public display" at 17 U.S.C. § 101.
21. The latest cameras, for example, use no film; the work is fixed on disk.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
23. Id.
24. The reason for overkill was to calm jittery use groups, particularly in the publishing
industry, which was a principal concern of VARA's sponsors. See Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws. Hearings on S.1198 and S. 1253 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and
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Problems arise from the terms "poster," "map," "globe," "chart,"

"technical drawing," "diagram," "model," and "applied art." It is often
difficult to discern the dividing line between a poster and a print.25 In
addition, a number of works of "fine art" created by well-known artists
could be described as "maps." For instance, Joseph Beuys created a
work showing a plan of the Paris Metro.26 Although it is in the form of a
map, it is clearly a work of fine art. If a map is created as "art" and not
merely designed to convey information, it should be protected. The same
result is possible with globes. Further, many charts, technical drawings,
diagrams, and even models are created as works of art rather than as
useful works. For example, I once saw a show of fanciful designs for an
office building in Chicago, in which the models being built were part of
an art contest.27 Each was clearly a work of fine art though ostensibly a
"model."
Perhaps the biggest problem area will be "applied art." Again, as
with posters, maps, globes, and charts, it must be the artist's intentions
that count. If the artist intends the work solely as something to be reproduced in utilitarian articles, e.g., on towels, bedspreads, or other commercial items, then perhaps the work is "applied art."2 If the work is
intended to be a work of fine art or to serve some "fine art" purpose,
however, a later or simultaneous commercial use should not preclude
protection. Congress could have qualified these exclusions in connection
with the artist's intentions and the ultimate use of the work, rather than
setting forth hard categories.
(A)(ii) [A

WORK OF VISUAL ART ALSO DOES NOT INCLUDE] ANY MER-

CHANDISING ITEM OR ADVERTISING, PROMOTIONAL, 2DESCRIPTIVE,
9
COVERING, OR PACKAGING MATERIAL OR CONTAINER.

Assuming we can define a "merchandising item" and "advertising
or promotional material or container," there will probably still be
problems with "descriptive" and "covering" materials or containers.
Any artwork with literary text may possibly constitute descriptive mateTrademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 32

(1989) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
25. See What is an Original Print?,supra note 11.

26. The work is in the form of a limited edition of 185 and is entitled Initiation Gauloise
(1976), according to the Thomas Babeor Gallery in La Jolla, California. See JOSEPH BEUYS
MULTIPLES 153 (J. Schellmann ed., 6th ed. 1985).
27. The traveling exhibition, probably emanating from Chicago, was called "Late Entries
to the Chicago Tribune Tower Competition." It was on display at the La Jolla Museum of
Contemporary Art, La Jolla, California, from September 13 through October 12, 1980.

28. See opinion of Lord Kilbrandon in George Hensher Ltd. v. Restawile Upholstery
(Lancs) Ltd., 1976 App. Cas. 64 (appeal taken from Eng.) (discussion of works of artistic
craftsmanship).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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rial. A number of works of fine art are designed to cover other items,
including fine art screens used to hide objects behind them.
(A)(iii) [A

WORK OF VISUAL ART ALSO DOES NOT INCLUDE] ANY POR30
TION OR PART OF ANY ITEM DESCRIBED IN CLAUSE (i) OR (ii).

If we cannot be certain about the definitions of the excluded works
themselves, further exclusion of their "parts" only makes matters worse.
(B) [A

WORK OF VISUAL ART ALSO DOES NOT INCLUDE] ANY WORK
31
MADE FOR HIRE.

Here is a real problem. Artists already have great difficulty determining the meaning of "work made for hire," as shown by the extensive
litigation in this area. What about a work only partially created for hire?
For example, using the facts and arguments presented to the U.S.
Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid,3 2 what
if the corporate employer's share of a joint work is "made for hire,"
while the independent artist's contribution is not? Could only the independent artist claim moral rights, or could the corporation claim that
because the artist's work was not made for hire, it, too, would have moral
rights? Or would both claims be unsuccessful because part of the work
was created for hire?
The only logical answer seems to be an all-or-nothing solution. It
would be anomalous, unfair, and misleading to allow the independent
artist to claim or disclaim credit for or prevent destruction of a work of
art, while co-artists working for the corporate employer and the corporate employer itself would not have the same rights. Either everyone
should have the rights, or no one should.
(C) [A

WORK OF VISUAL ART ALSO DOES NOT INCLUDE] ANY WORK
33
NOT SUBJECT TO COPYRIGHT PROTECTION UNDER THIS TITLE.

This provision, regardless of expressed intentions, does not exclude
from moral rights protection only works not potentially copyrightable,
i.e., works of authorship not covered by § 102(a) of the Copyright Act.
After all, paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and photographs are, by
definition, copyrightable subject matter.
Naturally, there are some works "not subject to copyright protection" that do not necessarily deserve moral rights protection. These in30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). In Reid, the Court held a commissioned sculpture created by an
independent contractor was not a "work for hire" within the meaning of § 101 of the Copyright Act. However, the Court remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether
the organization that commissioned the work was a joint author of the sculpture and, thus, a
co-owner of the copyright under § 201(a). Id. at 753.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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clude works of insufficient originality,34 those created by nationals of
countries which have no copyright relations with the United States, 35
those not fixed in a tangible medium of expression,36 and those otherwise
failing to meet the basic requirements for protection under sections 102
and 104 of the Copyright Act.
This exclusion will primarily encompass works placed in the public
domain because of the failure to use proper copyright notices before the
effective date of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 3 or
the expiration of the copyright term. Additionally, the exclusion covers
works that are subject to defenses to an infringement claim, such as estoppel and abandonment.3 8
In litigation under VARA, defendants may argue that copyright notices were not used before March 1, 1989. This is an unwelcome defense,
since the issue is not whether there is copyright protection but whether
there is moral rights protection. The artist should not forfeit the right to
claim or disclaim credit based on his or her failure to use a copyright
notice before March 1, 1989.

II
Rights

§ 106A RIGHTS OF CERTAIN AUTHORS TO ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY (a) RIGHTS OF ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITYSUBJECT TO
SECTION 107 AND INDEPENDENT OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS PROVIDED IN SECTION 106, THE AUTHOR OF A WORK OF VISUAL ART(1) SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT39
(A) TO CLAIM AUTHORSHIP OF THAT WORK.
The fair use defense under § 107 of the Copyright Act should have a
very limited role in the area of moral rights.' A use may infringe upon
an artist's moral rights even though it falls into a fair use exception. In
part, this is because § 107, which codifies the fair use doctrine, sets forth
considerations often having little to do with moral rights. The use or
misuse of a work for purposes such as news reporting, scholarship, criticism, review, or classroom teaching-the principal statutory considera34. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
35. Id. § 104 (Supp. 1991).
36. Id. § 102(a).
37. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). The effective date was March 1, 1989.
See Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 320 F. Supp. 1303, 1313 (N.D.
IlI. 1970) (good example of how an artist (Picasso) and his assignee lost copyright through
publication of work without a copyright notice).
38. See 2

MELVILLE

NIMMER

& DAVID

NIMMER,

NIMMER

ON

COPYRIGHT

§ 8.21[B][2][a] (1991).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A).
40. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 105-06 (statement of Peter H. Karlen).
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tions-should not necessarily nullify a moral rights violation. Whether
the conduct is carried out by a nonprofit educational organization is
often not relevant, nor is the amount and substantiality of the work used
or misused necessarily critical. Perhaps the third and fourth factors
listed as § 107 are relevant, namely, the nature of the work and the effect
on the market for or value of the work. Nonetheless, it is difficult to
imagine, except with landscape works protected as "sculptures," what a
fair use could be, especially based on the fair use arguments one typically
encounters in moral rights litigation.
"Fair use," as argued in moral rights cases, usually has little in common with "fair use" in copyright cases. For instance, when a landscape
or environmental work is involved, defendants often argue that the
work's removal is a "fair use" of their land. Sometimes defendants argue
that what they perceive as a flaw or error in artwork justifies a modification to "improve" it. Perhaps the closest kind of "fair use" case is where
a defendant has made repairs on a damaged or deteriorating work. 4 1
Moreover, the rights of attribution and integrity are not totally "independent of the exclusive rights provided in § 106," at least at one juncture. As Professors Melville Nimmer and David Nimmer point out in
their treatise on copyright law, 42 arguably the right to prevent "alteration" regulated by state moral rights statutes is equivalent to the exclusive right to prepare "derivative works" under § 106(2) of the Copyright
Act. Consequently, there could be an overlap between the "modification" moral right and the "adaptation" right under copyright law, because the "alteration" right under state statutes is probably equivalent to
the right to prevent "modification" under VARA. For example, if a second party owned both the physical art object and its copyright, she could
argue that her § 106(2) right to prepare a derivative work based on the
original work gives her the right to modify that original in direct conflict
with the artist's moral right to prevent modification.
As far as "claim authorship" is concerned, I still await the argument
that the artist can only "claim" credit but is not entitled to actually receive it.43 A literal reading of the statute would enable the artist only to
publicize herself as the author, not necessarily to receive credit on the
piece itself. The right to claim credit without the right to receive it does
not amount to anything. Naturally, the drafters were counting on the
notion that this kind of language, which originated from the Berne Con41. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c).
42. NIMMER, supra note 38, § 8.21 [B][3] (discussing the California statute, but also applicable to its progeny in other states).
43. See Peter H. Karlen, Moral Rights in California, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 675, 688-89
(1982).
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vention," would have the same meaning attached to it under Continental
jurisprudence. They also assumed that the judges and lawyers first viewing this statute would have the same familiarity with moral rights as the
readers of this article.
[THE AUTHOR OF A WORK OF VISUAL ART SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT]
TO PREVENT THE USE OF HIS OR HER NAME AS THE AUTHOR OF
45
ANY WORK OF VISUAL ART WHICH HE OR SHE DID NOT CREATE.

(B)

A perennial problem is that of the artist whose work suffers minor
"improvements" by a dissatisfied purchaser or by another artist hired by
the purchaser to make minor changes. Under the statute, arguably the
original artist must have little or no role in the creation in order to disclaim credit.46 The courts will likely construe the statute to allow disclaimer whenever the artist is neither: (1) a joint author who intended to
contribute to the work along with other joint authors, nor (2) an individual who created the entire work. But why leave this question to the
courts?
Another possible argument is that the word "prevent" implies an
equitable remedy, not one of damages. As with the term "claim," the
term "prevent" has limited application. While the word "claim" in the
previous subsection should be accompanied by a way to "receive" credit,
"prevent" in this subsection should perhaps be broadened to cover
money damages.
[T]HE AUTHOR OF A WORK OF VISUAL ART(2) SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO PREVENT THE USE OF HIS OR HER
NAME AS THE AUTHOR OF THE WORK OF VISUAL ART IN THE EVENT
OF A DISTORTION, MUTILATION, OR OTHER MODIFICATION OF THE
WORK WHICH4 7 WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO HIS OR HER HONOR OR
REPUTATION.

Again the word "prevent" connotes only an equitable remedy, a
meaning supported by the word "would" in connection with "prejudice
to honor or reputation." If an actual remedy were allowed after the
modification had been made, then the conduct "would" no longer be
prejudicial to honor or reputation but would actually be prejudicial. A
question also arises in relation to the burden of proof on the artist regarding what definitely "would" be prejudicial as opposed to what "could" be
prejudicial. There is no injunctive relief for "could," only "would"-and
no damages are clearly to be awarded in either case. It is sometimes
44. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, art. 6bis, reprinted in RICKETSON, supra note 3.

45. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(I)(B).
46. Cf Follett v. Arbor House Publishing. Co., 497 F. Supp. 304, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(author Ken Follett making lesser-than-advertised, though not negligible, contribution allowed
to diminish his credit).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2).
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difficult for the artist to prove prejudice to honor or reputation. Suppose,
for example, the owner restores, and therefore modifies, a badly deterio-

rated work so that the artist's honor or reputation does not suffer but
instead is enhanced?
The term "mutilation" should be broad enough to include "defacement," which is covered under state statutes.4 8 However, state statutes
refer to both "defacement" and "mutilation, '49 indicating a distinction.
Many works of art are merely defaced; thus, using the word "defacement" would have been proper. In fact, "defacement" is a more common violation than "distortion."
(3)

[S]UBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN SECTION

113(d)

(A)

[THE AUTHOR OF A WORK OF VISUAL ART SHALL] HAVE THE
RIGHT-TO PREVENT ANY INTENTIONAL DISTORTION, MUTILATION,
OR OTHER MODIFICATION OF THAT WORK WHICH WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO HIS OR HER. HONOR OR REPUTATION, AND ANY INTENTIONAL DISTORTION, MUTILATION, OR MODIFICATION OF THAT
50
WORK IS A VIOLATION OF THAT RIGHT.

Again, the word "prevent" is used to connote an equitable remedy,
especially when juxtaposed with language that gives a damages remedy

whenever there is an "intentional" violation. This supports the earlier
argument about "preventing" the use of the artist's name when the work
is not his or when the work has been mutilated. Again, the term "deface-

ment" should have been used, and again one should be aware that there
are cases where it would be difficult for the artist to argue prejudice to
honor or reputation.
It is anomalous that the artist's right to injunctive relief with regard
to distortion, mutilation, or other modification requires proof of "intentional" conduct, whereas the right to prevent destruction, set forth im-

mediately below, requires no mens rea. The artist should be entitled to
prevent conduct which the actor knows is likely to result in mutilation.

The different mens rea with respect to destruction and mutilation is
even more problematic when the line between "destruction" and "mutilation" is difficult to discern. Is a work destroyed only when blown to
smithereens, or is damage beyond repair considered "destroyed?" Quite

frankly, the courts cannot easily draw the line between destruction and
mutilation, and there should therefore be no difference between the mens
rea required for them.
(B)

[THE AUTHOR OF A WORK OF VISUAL ART SHALL HAVE THE

RIGHT] TO PREVENT ANY DESTRUCTION OF A WORK OF RECOGNIZED

48. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 987; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03.
49. Id.
50. 17 U.S.C. 106A(3)(A).
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STATURE, AND ANY INTENTIONAL OR GROSSLY NEGLIGENT DE51
STRUCTION OF THAT WORK IS A VIOLATION OF THAT RIGHT.

The "recognized stature" standard is much more stringent than the
"recognized quality" requirement under some state statutes.5 2 "Recognized stature" implies that the work has already received acclaim and
has been highly regarded by the art world or by the public, regardless of
quality.5 3 In terms of aesthetic theory, a work has three principal values:

artistic, art-historical, and aesthetic.54 The artistic value of a work stems
from the artistic achievement of the artist; the art-historical value is derived from the work's position and role in art history; and the work's
aesthetic value is based on its aesthetic characteristics. A work of "recognized stature" need not have aesthetic value, and sometimes not even
artistic value.
On the other hand, a work of "recognized quality" might not be
deemed to have stature but be recognized by authorities as having sufficient quality to merit preservation. Moreover, the "quality" standard
makes it extremely difficult for owner-defendants to argue that the work
didn't have the requisite quality. After all, they purchased the work only
after conducting an arduous selection process. These defendants usually
cannot deny "recognized quality" without otherwise impugning their
55
own judgment.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty with the "recognized stature" standard is that a work only achieves "stature" in the art-historical sense
after a significant amount of time has passed. However, many works of
art are destroyed soon after creation or installation, before they can
achieve any "stature." Most moral rights cases we have encountered involved works in existence for two years or fewer; very rarely did they
involve works around for decades. For example, with cases involving
public works commissioned by municipalities, the move to oust the work,
51. 17 U.S.C. 106A(3)(B).
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to -I 16t; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-:2156; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303; MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 85S; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 598.970-.978; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 24A-1 to -8;
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-2 to -3; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01, 14.03; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2 to -6; UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-2a-

9.
53. See GEORGE DICKIE, ART AND THE AESTHETIC: AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
(1974) (art status defined by institutional acceptance).
54. See Thomas Kulka, The Artistic and Aesthetic Value of Art, 21 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS
336 (1981).

55. See Senate Hearings,supra note 24, at 106-08; see generally Peter H. Karlen, Aesthetic
Quality and Art Preservation, 41 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 309 (1983).
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which arises from a disgruntled citizenry, usually comes within weeks or
56
months of installation.
Finally, it is not clear why this subsection should contain only two
kinds of mens rea-"intention" and "gross negligence." What about a
"knowing" or "reckless" destruction?57
III
Scope and Exercise of Rights
(b)

SCOPE AND EXERCISE OF RIGHTS. ONLY THE AUTHOR OF A
WORK OF VISUAL ART HAS THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY SUBSECTION
(a) IN THAT WORK, WHETHER OR NOT THE AUTHOR IS THE COPYRIGHT OWNER. THE AUTHORS OF A JOINT WORK OF VISUAL ART
ARE CO-OWNERS
OF THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY SUBSECTION (a) IN
58
THAT WORK.

The first sentence of this section may have a technical problem. Because protection extends for the life of the author plus 50 years for certain works created before VARA's effective date (June 1, 1991), persons
other than the author will have these rights, namely the author's heirs.
However, for works created after the effective date, "only the author"
will have the rights, since they end at the author's death.
This section has a bigger problem in the second sentence, which
specifies that jointly-owned moral rights will be treated the same way as
jointly-owned copyrights. 59 This is an unmitigated disaster. Under
60
copyright law, in the absence of a written agreement to the contrary,
any person making more than a minimal qualifying contribution to the
work will be considered a joint author and, therefore, a joint and equal
owner of the copyright.6" A joint author/owner has the right to grant
non-exclusive licenses with respect to the entire work without the consent of other joint authors, subject only to an accounting for the other
joint authors'/owners' equal shares of the profits. 62 A joint owner, there56. See Peter H. Karlen, Moral Rights and Real Life Artists, 15 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT
L.J. 929 (1993) (detailing cases involving public controversies regarding removals). As the
Second Circuit noted in Serra v. U.S. Gen. Serv. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1047 (2d Cir. 1988),
"The pigeons had barely begun to roost on 'Tilted Arc' [Serra's work] before the sculpture

became the object of intense public criticism."
57. See Karlen, supra note 43, at 707-11 (mens rea categories for moral rights violations).
58. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b).
59. See H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1990) (House report on VARA).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (1978) (requiring copyright transfers, including transfers of joint
copyright ownership interests, to be in writing).
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "joint work"); § 201(a) (copyright ownership of
joint work); § 106A(b) (joint authors as joint moral rights owners); NIMMER, supra note 38,

§§ 6.03, 6.07, 6.08.
62.

NIMMER,

supra note 38, at §§ 6.06, 6.10, 6.12.
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fore, cannot sue another joint owner for copyright infringement. 63 Ap6
plying these same rules to moral rights, however, makes little sense.
Allowing one joint author to "license" or waive moral rights on behalf of all joint authors is unfair, since it would allow one joint author to
65
waive all the other joint authors' rights to claim or disclaim credit.
Similarly, one joint author could authorize the destruction of the work,
and the other joint authors could do nothing. 66 Moreover, in the absence
of a written agreement to the contrary, are all joint authors considered
equal, as under copyright law? 67 For example, is the very minor contributor equally entitled to claim and disclaim credit as the principal artist?
In my mind, he should not be. Should he be entitled to authorize destruction of the work contrary to the wishes of the principal co-authors?
Again, no.
Moral rights and copyrights are completely different rights. Thus,
there is little reason for the joint authorship rules to be the same. Moreover, the public policy to encourage licensing of copyrighted works by
permitting any joint owner to license without the consent of the others is
more important than encouraging the licensing of destruction, mutilation, or alteration of works of art.

IV
Exceptions to the Rights
(c) EXCEPTIONS.
(1) THE MODIFICATION OF A WORK OF VISUAL ART WHICH IS A RESULT OF THE PASSAGE OF TIME OR THE INHERENT NATURE OF THE
MATERIALS IS NOT A DISTORTION, MUTILATION, OR OTHER MODIFI68
CATION DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (a)(3)(A).

This language does not address the question of how to deal with a
work that is negligently, knowingly, or intentionally exposed to the elements. This includes not only rain and snow but also works placed in
bright light. For instance, Mark Rothko once permitted an installation
of large works to be exposed to light so strong that they faded to nothing. 69 Again, there is a fine line between reasonably cared-for works that
deteriorate over a long period of time and improperly cared-for works
that would not have deteriorated had they received proper care. To
63. Id.
64. See Karlen, supra note 17, at 246-48, 251-62.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (allowing one joint owner to waive the rights of all). See also
Karlen, supra note 17, at 256-58.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Karlen, supra note 17, at 256-58.
Karlen, supra note 17, at 252-53.
17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(l).
Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (liability in connection with lighting and placement).
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make the statutory language clearer and more effective, the word
"solely" could have been inserted before the words "a result."
The same applies to the phrase "inherent nature of the materials."
If exposed to certain conditions, some materials will rapidly deteriorate.
Anyone knowingly exposing a work to such conditions would seem to be
deliberately destroying it.
(2) THE MODIFICATION OF A WORK OF VISUAL ART WHICH IS THE
RESULT OF CONSERVATION, OR OF THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION, INCLUDING LIGHTING AND PLACEMENT, OF THE WORK IS NOT A DESTRUCTION, DISTORTION, MUTILATION, OR OTHER MODIFICATION
DESCRIBED IN SUBSECTION (a)(3)
UNLESS THE MODIFICATION IS
7
CAUSED BY GROSS NEGLIGENCE. 0

This section fails to clearly address the situation where modification
is caused by knowing or reckless conduct. Perhaps it should read:
". modification is caused by at least gross negligence."71
Another drafting error here is that the exception applies only to a
"modification" of a work. What about distortion, mutilation, or destruction which results from gross negligence in the process of conservation or
public presentation? Shouldn't these also be actionable? Even if not,
who can draw the line between "modification" and "distortion" or
"mutilation"?
The definition of "public presentation" 7 2 is also unclear. Does it
have to be in a public place, or will a private reception satisfy the requirement? In any case, this was an unusual way of reintroducing liability for
gross negligence for modifications, when subsection (a)(3) primarily addresses intentional conduct.
(3) THE RIGHTS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPHS (1) AND (2) OF SUBSECTION (a) [THE RIGHTS TO CLAIM AND DISCLAIM CREDIT] SHALL NOT
APPLY TO ANY REPRODUCTION, DEPICTION, PORTRAYAL, OR OTHER
USE OF A WORK IN, UPON, OR IN ANY CONNECTION WITH ANY ITEM
DESCRIBED AT SUBPARAGRAPH (A) [SPECIFICALLY-DEFINED EXCLUDED WORKS] OR (B) [WORKS MADE FOR HIRE] OF THE DEFINITION OF "WORK OF VISUAL ART" AT SECTION 101, AND ANY
REPRODUCTION, DEPICTION, PORTRAYAL, OR OTHER USE OF A WORK
IS NOT A DESTRUCTION, DISTORTION, MUTILATION, OR OTHER 3MODI7
FICATION DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH (3) OF SUBSECTION (a).

Perhaps one problem with depriving artists of crediting rights in
connection with commercial depictions of their works is that these depic70. Id.
71. Under the California moral rights statute "gross negligence" is "the exercise of so
slight a degree of care as to justify the belief that there was an indifference to the particular
work of fine art." CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(2).
72. For consistency, why not use the terminology "public display," which is used in the
definition of "publication" at 17 U.S.C. § 101 or in the rights set out at 17 U.S.C. § 106?
73. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3).
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tions are often used to deprive the artist of credit or injure the artist's
reputation by crediting her with work she didn't create. For example, it
is one thing for owners of an ordinary magazine to be immune from artists' rights to claim or disclaim credit in connection with depictions of
their artwork in the magazine, particularly in advertisements. Consider,
however, an art magazine review that depicts the artist's work without
giving credit, or depicts the work in mutilated form while wrongfully
crediting the artist. In that situation, perhaps there should be no
immunity.
It is puzzling that, even though a reproduction, depiction or other
similar use won't itself be an actionable destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification, there isn't a specific exemption for physically
mutilating, distorting, destroying, or modifying reproductions or depictions that are not qualifying limited edition multiples under the definition
74
of "work of visual art."

V
Duration of Rights
(d)

DURATION OF RIGHTS.
(1) WITH RESPECT TO WORKS OF VISUAL ART CREATED ON OR AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE SET FORTH IN SECTION 610(a) OF THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990,75 THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY
SUBSECTION (a) SHALL76 ENDURE FOR A TERM CONSISTING OF THE
LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.

It is unclear why the general term of protection is not conterminous
with the general copyright term-life plus 50 years.77 Under the current
wording, any violations occurring after the author's death must be handled under state law when preemption under 17 U.S.C. § 301(f) will not
apply. Therefore, with physically altered or destroyed works, disputes
are likely to arise about whether the conduct took place before or after
the artist's death. Though there will be a three-year statute of limitations
under § 507 of the Copyright Act, the courts are not likely to strictly
impose that limitation on artists or their heirs when the artist or heirs are
unaware of when the conduct took place.7 8 Many times the artist or
74. 17 U.S.C. § 101. See Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights
Act: A Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1733, 1740 (1984) (discussing moral rights
and reproductions). See also Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying New York statute to altered reproductions).
75. June 1,1991, according to Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5132 (1990).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(l).
77. Id. § 302 (1978).
78. But usually only a "concealment" will prevent the running of the statute in a copyright case. See NIMMER, supra note 38, § 12.05.
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heirs discover that a work is missing or that it has been destroyed, but
cannot establish the date of the wrong.
(2) WITH RESPECT TO WORKS OF VISUAL ART CREATED BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVE DATE SET FORTH IN SECTION 610(a) OF THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, BUT TITLE TO WHICH HAS NOT, AS OF
SUCH EFFECTIVE DATE, BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM THE AUTHOR,
THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY SUBSECTION (a) SHALL BE COEXTENSIVE
WITH, AND SHALL EXPIRE AT THE SAME TIME AS, THE RIGHTS CON79
FERRED BY SECTION 106.

Here, the assumption is that readers will construe the transfer of
"title" in reference to the physical art object. Technically speaking, however, a work of authorship is intangible, especially in comparison to the
physical art object-the "copy" in which it is embodied.8 °
(3)

IN THE CASE OF A JOINT WORK PREPARED BY TWO OR MORE
AUTHORS, THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY SUBSECTION (a) SHALL ENDURE FOR8 1A TERM CONSISTING OF THE LIFE OF THE LAST SURVIVING
AUTHOR.
2

This rule is consistent with the rules for duration of copyright and
makes sense. As with copyrights, choose infants for your collaborators.
(4) ALL TERMS OF THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY SUBSECTION (a) RUN
CALENDAR YEAR IN WHICH THEY WOULD
TO THE END OF THE
83
OTHERWISE EXPIRE.
84

Again, this is consistent with copyright protection rules.

VI
Transfer and Waiver
(e) TRANSFER AND WAIVER.
(1) THE RIGHTS CONFERRED

BY SUBSECTION (a) MAY NOT BE
TRANSFERRED, BUT THOSE RIGHTS MAY BE WAIVED IF THE AUTHOR
EXPRESSLY AGREES TO SUCH WAIVER IN A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT
SIGNED BY THE AUTHOR. SUCH INSTRUMENT SHALL SPECIFICALLY
IDENTIFY THE WORK, AND USES OF THAT WORK, TO WHICH THE
WAIVER APPLIES, AND THE WAIVER SHALL APPLY ONLY TO THE
WORK AND THE USES SO IDENTIFIED. IN THE CASE OF A JOINT WORK
PREPARED BY TWO OR MORE AUTHORS, A WAIVER OF RIGHTS UNDER
ONE SUCH AUTHOR WAIVES SUCH RIGHTS
THIS PARAGRAPH MADE BY
85
FOR ALL SUCH AUTHORS.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(2).
80. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(c)(2), 202; see also Peter H. Karlen, Worldmaking: Property
Rights in Aesthetic Creations, 45 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 183 (1986).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(3).

82. Id. § 302(b).
83. Id. § 106A(d)(4).

84. Id. § 305.
85. Id. § 106A(e)(1).
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As mentioned above, this rule for waiver by one joint author can be

disastrous.8 6 A minor contributor can waive crediting rights for the principal contributors.8 7 It is one thing for a joint copyright owner to grant a
non-exclusive license, which in most cases does not completely destroy

the value of the copyrighted work. It is another thing for one co-author
to allow complete destruction of a work of art without consent of the
others.
(2)

OWNERSHIP OF THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY SUBSECTION (a)
WITH RESPECT TO A WORK OF VISUAL ART IS DISTINCT FROM OWNERSHIP OF ANY COPY OF THAT WORK, OR OF A COPYRIGHT OR ANY
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT UNDER A COPYRIGHT IN THAT WORK. TRANSFER
OF OWNERSHIP OF ANY COPY OF A WORK OF VISUAL ART, OR OF A
COPYRIGHT OR ANY EXCLUSIVE RIGHT UNDER A COPYRIGHT, SHALL
NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY SUBSECTION (a). EXCEPT AS MAY OTHERWISE BE AGREED BY THE AUTHOR
IN A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT SIGNED BY THE AUTHOR, A WAIVER OF
THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY SUBSECTION (a) WITH RESPECT TO A
WORK OF VISUAL ART SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE A TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF ANY COPY OF THAT WORK, OR OF OWNERSHIP OF A COPYRIGHT OR OF ANY EXCLUSIVE RIGHT UNDER A COPYRIGHT IN THAT
WORK. 88

These provisions are consistent with § 202 of the Copyright Act,
which distinguishes copyright ownership from ownership of the physical
object in which the work is embodied. Assuming there is no conflict
between or overlapping of the "modification" right under § 106A and the
"adaptation" right under § 106(2) as discussed above, 9 the tripartite division of ownership, elaborately confirmed, is workable and consistent
with the policies behind copyright and moral rights laws.

VII
Works in Buildings
§ 113(a)

SCOPE OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN PICTORIAL, GRAPHIC, AND
SCULPTURAL WORKS
(1)

IN A CASE IN WHICH-

(A)

A WORK OF VISUAL ART HAS BEEN INCORPORATED IN
OR MADE PART OF A BUILDING IN SUCH A WAY THAT REMOVING THE
WORK FROM THE BUILDING WILL CAUSE THE DESTRUCTION, DISTORTION, MUTILATION, OR OTHER MODIFICATION OF THE WORK AS DE-

SCRIBED SECTION

106A(a)(3),

AND

(B)

THE AUTHOR CONSENTED TO THE INSTALLATION OF
THE WORK IN THE BUILDING EITHER BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE
SET FORTH IN SECTION 610(a) OF THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT

86. See supra text accompanying notes 59-67.
87. See Karlen, supra note 17, at 258.
88. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2).
89. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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OF 1990, OR IN A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT EXECUTED ON OR AFTER
SUCH EFFECTIVE DATE THAT IS SIGNED BY THE OWNER OF THE
BUILDING AND THE AUTHOR AND THAT SPECIFIES THAT INSTALLATION OF THE WORK MAY SUBJECT THE WORK TO DESTRUCTION, DISTORTION, AND MUTILATION, OR OTHER MODIFICATION, BY REASON
OF ITS REMOVAL, THEN THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY PARAGRAPHS (2)
AND (3) OF SECTION 10 6 A(a) [RIGHTS OF DISCLAIMER AND OF INTEGRITY] SHALL NOT APPLY. 9

Because there has been little or no litigation over the meaning of the
term "building," this term should have been defined at 17 U.S.C. § 101.9"
Not every edifice is a "building." For example, what about a monument,
a concrete support section for an elevated highway, or a landscape work?
The essence of most "buildings" is the enclosed space created and sheltered by the construction. Many monuments have enclosed space, and
the question is whether the enclosed space is meant for shelter or human
habitation. 92
Perhaps the greatest fault of all the moral rights statutes providing
integrity rights, both state and federal, is that they distinguish between
removable and non-removable works. As some of the litigation shows, if
enough money is spent, almost any work can be "removed." 93 Thus, in
almost all cases, there is no distinction between removable and non-removable works. It is also a puzzle why removability is couched only in
terms of "harm" to the work rather than to the building. 94
What is terribly wrong about this section is that works consensually
installed before the effective date of the Act (June 1, 1991) could be unprotected. The legislation should have left an exemption for those artists
who had actually reserved their moral rights in a written instrument
signed by the building owner. One concern is that many such artists
installing non-removable works may have relied on integrity rights existing under the various state statutes, requiring written reservation of
90. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1).
91. After all, the definition of "architectural work" at 17 U.S.C. § 101 also depends on
what is a "building," and state moral rights statutes similarly have "works-in-buildings"
clauses that do not define the term. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987; CONN. GEN. STAT.

ANN. §§ 42-116s to -I16t; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 134B-2 to -3; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110.
92. See H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990) (House report on computer
software rentals and the Architectural Works Protection Act of 1990) (definition of
"building").
93. See Peter H. Karlen, Art Destruction: The Michael Schnorr Case, ARTWEEK, Mar.
28, 1987, at 11; Peter H. Karlen, Art Destruction: The Michael Schnorr Verdict, ARTWEEK,
Oct. 31, 1987, at 12.
94. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 987; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-:2156; MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 231, § 85S; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110.
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moral rights for such installations. 9 However, now that the federal statute preempts all state laws covering the same rights and subject matter,
arguably the state moral rights reserved in writing may no longer apply,
96
and the artist is completely unprotected by statute.
Perhaps in such a case, the artist could argue that the preemption
statute only applies to "works of visual art to which the rights conferred
by § 106A apply."97 Because the rights will not apply to earlier works,
there would arguably be no preemption and state law protection would
remain.
The worst thing about this subsection is that it takes the opposite
approach from that of the state statutes. Under the California statute
and its progeny, 98 the artist must get a written reservation of rights to
protect his or her rights in non-removable works installed in buildings.
Under VARA, the building owner must get a written consent to installation. Under the state statutes, if the artist failed to obtain a written reservation or the owner refused to give one, the artist might lose the work
upon its removal. Under VARA, however, the forgetful owner could be
saddled with a problem of immense proportions if the work must be removed or the building demolished. Moreover, an artist who believes he
is protected under federal law because the building owner failed to get a
''consent" could have his works destroyed immediately upon his death,
when state law again applies. 99
(2) IF THE OWNER OF A BUILDING WISHES TO REMOVE A WORK OF
VISUAL ART WHICH IS PART OF SUCH BUILDING AND WHICH CAN BE
REMOVED FROM THE BUILDING WITHOUT THE DESTRUCTION, DISTORTION, MUTILATION, OR OTHER MODIFICATION OF THE WORK AS
DESCRIBED IN SECTION 106A(a)(3), THE AUTHOR'S RIGHTS UNDER
PARAGRAPHS (2) AND (3) OF SECTION 106A(a) [THE RIGHTS OF DISCLAIMER AND INTEGRITY] SHALL APPLY UNLESS-

(A) THE OWNER HAS MADE A DILIGENT, GOOD FAITH ATTEMPT
WITHOUT SUCCESS TO NOTIFY THE AUTHOR OF THE OWNER'S IN10 0
TENDED ACTION AFFECTING THE WORK OF VISUAL ART.

In this section a "written" notice should have been mentioned in
relation to "good faith" efforts. Also, the emphasis on the owner locating the artist to give notice is wrong. Artists should be required to regis95. See, e.g. CAL. CiV. CODE § 987; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to -116t; LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-:2156; MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 231, § 85S; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 2101-2110.
96. Of course, those artists might still retain protection via their contract rights under the

written instrument.
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1).
98. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110.
99. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(d)(1), 301(f)(2)(C).
100. Id. § 113(d)(2)(a).
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ter installed works with the Copyright Office rather than have an
optional registration, as mentioned below.' 0 ' Every artist could then easily receive a notice, and those who fail to record or update their registration would be out of luck. Another ploy suggested by the California
resale royalties law is to allow owners to send notices to the Copyright
Office, even for unregistered artists, so that receipt by the Copyright Of02
fice will be deemed good notice to the artist.
It is also unclear how this section would apply to joint works. Is
notifying only one joint author enough? If so, the building owner could
deliberately notify only the joint author willing to go along with removal
10 3
and loss of moral rights.
(B) IF

THE OWNER OF A BUILDING WISHES TO REMOVE A WORK OF
VISUAL ART WHICH IS PART OF SUCH BUILDING AND WHICH CAN BE
REMOVED FROM THE BUILDING WITHOUT THE DESTRUCTION, DISTORTION, MUTILATION, OR OTHER MODIFICATION OF THE WORK AS
DESCRIBED IN SECTION 106A(a)(3), THE AUTHOR'S RIGHTS UNDER
PARAGRAPHS (2) AND (3) OF SECTION 106A(a) [THE RIGHTS OF DISCLAIMER AND INTEGRITY] SHALL APPLY UNLESS THE OWNER DID
PROVIDE SUCH NOTICE IN WRITING AND THE PERSON SO NOTIFIED
FAILED, WITHIN 90 DAYS AFTER RECEIVING SUCH NOTICE, EITHER
10 4
TO REMOVE THE WORK OR TO PAY FOR ITS REMOVAL.

It is unclear why this section refers to a "person so notified" rather
than an "author" so notified. Also, there is again a problem with joint
authorship because the "person so notified" may decline to remove the
work, whereas other joint authors might have acted differently. 0I 5 Because this part of VARA works just like the integrity rights provided
under various state statutes, 0 6 the critique raised regarding the California statute is applicable here.'0° With removable works, there is no problem giving the building owner wide latitude to remove them. But if the
work is easily taken out of the building, why should the building owner
subsequently be allowed to destroy it if the artist has not come forward to
remove the piece or pay for its removal?' 08 After all, the removed piece
is now just like any other work not originally installed in a building.
Perhaps the only argument is that some attempt to notify the artist was
101. See id. § 113(d)(2)(B), (d)(3).
102. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a).
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (allowing waiver by any joint owner).
104.

17 U.S.C.

§

l13(d)(2)(B).

105. Cf Karlen, supra note 17, at 267-68 (proposals regarding registration, notification,
and jointly-owned rights).
106. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-:2156; MASS. GEN
LAWS ANN. ch 231, § 85S; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110.
107. See Karlen, supra note 43, at 718-21.
108. Id.
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made, or notice was actually given, and the building owner had to incur

the expense of removal.
FOR PURPOSES OF SUBPARAGRAPH (A), AN OWNER SHALL BE PRESUMED TO HAVE MADE A DILIGENT, GOOD FAITH ATTEMPT TO SEND
NOTICE IF THE OWNER SENT SUCH NOTICE BY REGISTERED MAIL TO
THE AUTHOR AT THE MOST RECENT ADDRESS OF THE AUTHOR THAT
WAS RECORDED BY THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS PURSUANT TO
PARAGRAPH (3). IF THE WORK IS REMOVED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
AUTHOR, TITLE TO THAT
COPY OF THE WORK SHALL BE DEEMED TO
10 9
BE IN THE AUTHOR.

Again, this system doesn't make much sense. The artist should have
a mandatory recording. Additionally, if title to the installed copy of the
work is "deemed to be in the author" who removed the work, what happens with joint works? Does the co-author who undertakes the expense
of removal thereby acquire complete ownership?"' Also, what happens
to security interests and liens imposed on the physical art object by the
building owner? Does the author not only get full title vis-i-vis the
building owner, but also in relation to all other persons who may have
acquired interests in the physical art object?"..
(3) THE

REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS SHALL ESTABLISH A SYSTEM OF
RECORDS WHEREBY ANY AUTHOR OF A WORK OF VISUAL ART THAT
HAS BEEN INCORPORATED IN OR MADE PART OF A BUILDING, MAY
RECORD HIS IDENTITY AND ADDRESS WITH THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE.
THE REGISTER SHALL ALSO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES UNDER WHICH
ANY SUCH AUTHOR MAY UPDATE THE INFORMATION SO RECORDED,
AND PROCEDURES UNDER WHICH OWNERS OF BUILDINGS MAY RECORD WITH THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE
EVIDENCE OF THEIR EFFORTS TO
1 12
COMPLY WITH THIS SUBSECTION.

The Copyright Office has issued regulations which prescribe the
content of the recorded documents." 13 However, no forms have yet been
developed for these recordings, so the artist or building owner must ensure that the document submitted contains all the prescribed information. So far only one artist has recorded under this statute,' another
reason for the contention that artists should be required to record or
109. 17 U.S.C. § 113 (d)(2).
110. It would seem so. After all, ownership of the physical art object is distinct from
copyright and moral rights ownership according to 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(e)(1) and 202, so that
status as joint moral rights owner and copyright owner would not affect the ability to acquire
full title to the art object by purchase.
11. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-201 to -318 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (acquisition and perfection of
security interests and rights of third parties).
112. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(3).
113. 37 C.F.R. § 201.25 (1992) ("Visual Arts Registry").
114, See Peter H. Karlen, Art Destruction: The John Spears Case, ART CALENDAR, Feb.
1993, at 11.
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otherwise lose their rights to receive notices of removal directly sent to
their addresses.
VIII
Preemption
§ 301

PREEMPTION WITH RESPECT TO OTHER LAWS
(F)(1) ON OR AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE SET FORTH IN SECTION 610(a) OF THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT OF 1990 [JUNE 1,
1991], ALL LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RIGHTS THAT ARE EQUIVALENT TO
ANY OF THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY SECTION 106A WITH RESPECT
TO WORKS OF VISUAL ART TO WHICH THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY
SECTION 106A APPLY ARE GOVERNED EXCLUSIVELY BY SECTION
106A AND SECTION 113(d) AND THE PROVISIONS OF THIS TITLE RELATING TO SUCH SECTIONS. THEREAFTER, NO PERSON IS ENTITLED
TO ANY SUCH RIGHT OR EQUIVALENT RIGHT IN ANY WORK OF VIS15
UAL ART UNDER THE COMMON LAW OR STATUTES OF ANY STATE."

This is the same kind of preemption language used for copyrights
under 17 U.S.C. § 301. This preemption statute will ultimately give rise
to litigation simply because of the problems associated with defining protected subject matter (the "work of visual art"' 6) and the rights conferred by § 106A. A question that arises is whether the "alteration" and
"defacement" rights under the state statutes will be equivalent to the
"modification" and "mutilation" rights under the federal statute. For
example, the New York and California statutes and their progeny refer
both to "mutilation" and "defacement," which signifies that such terms
have different meanings and therefore are not equivalent.'
Also, because the federal statute only allows disclaimer for mutilated works if mutilation has been prejudicial to the artist's honor or
reputation, is this equivalent to the much broader right under state law
to disclaim for any "just and valid reason"?" 8 Arguably, where there
has been no prejudice to honor or reputation but the artist has a just and
valid cause for disclaimer, the artist should be allowed to proceed under
state law.
(2) NOTHING IN PARAGRAPH (1) ANNULS OR LIMITS ANY RIGHTS OR
REMEDIES UNDER THE COMMON LAW OR STATUTES OF ANY STATE
WITH RESPECT TO17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1).
Definition at 17 U.S.C. § 101.
117. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987; CONN. STAT ANN. §§ 42-116s to -116t; LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2151-:2156; ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit 27, § 303; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:
24A-1 to -8; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 11.01, 14.03; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 21012110.
118. See id.
115.

116.
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(A) ANY CAUSE OF ACTION FROM UNDERTAKINGS COMMENCED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE SET FORTH IN SECTION
610(a) OF THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHT ACT OF 1990;
(B) ACTIVITIES VIOLATING LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RIGHTS
THAT ARE NOT EQUIVALENT TO ANY OF THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY
SECTION 106A WITH RESPECT TO SUCH WORKS OF VISUAL ART; OR
(C) ACTIVITIES VIOLATING LEGAL OR EQUITABLE
RIGHTS
1 19
WHICH EXTEND BEYOND THE LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.

As mentioned above, determining whether the legal or equitable
rights are equivalent may be a very difficult task; moreover, it is not clear
why protection did not extend for the full copyright term.
Ix
Conclusion
Despite its problems, VARA can still weather any storm of litigation. It is too bad, however, that the drafters left so much to be decided
by the courts. Unfortunately Congress, though considering moral rights
legislation for years, had scarcely any precedents on which to rely. After
all, state laws had generated few appellate decisions by the time VARA
was given life.120 Thus, only practice under VARA will prime new
amendments.
Mistakes and all, VARA is still arguably the most important legislation for artists ever enacted in the United States, and its sponsors deserve
credit just for getting it passed over the objections and criticisms of user
groups.

119. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(2).
120. California, which has the oldest statute and probably has had the most moral rights
litigation, only has had two appellate cases, neither of much consequence. In Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d at 644 (1984), the court peripherally
noted that architectural plans are not "drawings" under the California Art Preservation Act.
In Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1130 (1991), the court said the obvious, a mural is
a "painting" under the statute.

